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I. AN INTRODUCTION: PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED
SUICIDE & THE “RIGHT TO DIE”
Physician-assisted suicide has been the subject of fierce
debate over the past few decades, and there is no doubt that it is an
extremely sensitive issue with compelling arguments from both its
detractors and its supporters. Its opponents usually refer to the
practice of physician-assisted suicide by either that name, simply
“suicide,” or euthanasia.2 Advocates of physician-assisted suicide
term the procedure as physician-assisted death, physician aid in
dying, or “death with dignity.”3 This Note will use the term
“physician-assisted suicide,” as that seems to be the most neutral
way to term the practice. In order to make sure that the connotations
behind this term are expressed correctly and persuasively, it is
important to begin with a discussion of various terms related to the
broader concept of “the right to die,” of which physician-assisted
suicide is one subcategory.
The “right to die” has developed through case law (the
progression of which will be addressed later), and its expression
typically refers to a patient’s right to refuse medical treatment or to
have medical treatment withdrawn, even if either of those actions
result in the patient’s death.4 This right is subject to heightened
evidentiary standards that courts may impose on patients and/or
their representatives.5 The underlying rationale behind allowing
patients or their representatives to make such irreversible decisions
is that patient autonomy and the preservation of dignity are implicit
in the concept of an individual’s liberty rights.6 Be that as it may,
the concept of the “right to die,” as opposed to the legal term,
encompasses voluntary euthanasia, non-assisted suicide, and
physician-assisted suicide.7 It is important to note that physicianassisted suicide is simply a subset of this broader concept, and it is
being developed through both courts and legislatures throughout the
country.8 Additionally, the major distinction between the general
2

Annette E. Clark, Autonomy and Death, 71 TUL. L. REV. 45, 100 (1996).
Katherine A. Chamberlain, Looking for a "Good Death": The Elderly
Terminally Ill's Right to Die by Physician-Assisted Suicide, 17 ELDER L.J. 61, 65
(2009).
4
Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Right to Die with Assistance, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 2021, 2021 (1992).
5
See generally Cruzan v. Missouri, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
6
Jennifer Porter, Who Lives? Who Dies? Who Decides?, 14 GEO. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 599, 600 (2016).
7
Lara L. Manzione, Is There a Right to Die?: A Comparative Study of Three
Societies (Australia, Netherlands, United States), 30 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
443, 444 (2002).
8
Id.
3
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“right to die” as it is understood in the United States and physicianassisted suicide as it is understood generally is that the “right to die”
is mostly passive, while physician-assisted suicide requires the
physician to take an active role in helping the patient achieve the
goal of his or her death.9
“Euthanasia” is defined as “the act or practice of killing or
permitting the death of hopelessly sick or injured individuals (as
persons or domestic animals) in a relatively painless way for reasons
of mercy.”10 As with the “right to die,” physician-assisted suicide is
simply part of this definition, although many incorrectly consider
“euthanasia” and “physician-assisted suicide” synonymous.11
However, using the terms interchangeably is a misnomer and
ignores the various procedural safeguards in place for the latter.
Relatedly, “assisted suicide” is defined as “suicide
committed by someone with assistance from another person.”12
Without the prefatory term “physician,” this could include all
persons rendering suicidal aid to another, ranging from a physician
to a friend to a complete stranger being paid for a “mercy killing.”13
By contrast, “physician-assisted suicide” is defined as “suicide by a
patient facilitated by means (as a drug prescription) or by
information (as an indication of a lethal dosage) provided by a
physician aware of the patient’s intent.”14
This demonstrates the importance of utilizing the correct
terminology when referring to this practice and placing it in the
public sphere for discourse and debate, which is, as this Note will
demonstrate, where these arguments properly belong.
A.

Current Legal Status of Physician-Assisted Suicide

Physician-assisted suicide is legal in a few foreign countries,
and it is lawful in even fewer American states.15 The most liberal of
such laws are in Belgium, a country that allows children to request
9

See generally Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
“euthanasia.” Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. 2017.
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/euthanasia (last visited February
2, 2017).
11
See generally John Deigh, Physician-Assisted Suicide and Voluntary
Euthanasia: Some Relevant Differences, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1155
(1998).
12
“assisted suicide.” Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. 2017.
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/assisted%20suicide (last visited
February 2, 2017).
13
Need cite and explain “mercy killing” if it is in quotes.
14
“physician-assisted suicide.” Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. 2017.
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/physician-assisted%2Bsuicide
(last visited Febuary 2, 2017).
15
Christina Sandefur, Safeguarding the Right to Try, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 513, 51516 (2017).
10

63

BELMONT PRACS. GUIDE TO HEALTH L. & POL’Y

VOL. I

physician-assisted suicide as long as they are competently able to
understand the consequences of the request.16 By contrast, the
statutory rights that have been created in the various jurisdictions
within the United States where physician-assisted suicide is legal are
incredibly strict and contain a number of procedural safeguards.
Physician-assisted suicide is currently a statutory right in Oregon,
Washington, Vermont, California, Colorado, and the District of
Columbia.17 It is legal at common law only in the state of Montana.18
Before assessing these safeguards as indicating the best approach to
obtaining and implementing physician-assisted suicide within the
states, a brief historical overview is necessary to place the
progression of the law in this area in its proper context.
B.

Supreme Court Jurisprudence & The “Right to Die”

The first case ever to be heard by the United States Supreme
Court regarding the issues related to “right to die” was Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Department of Health.19 The plaintiff, Nancy
Cruzan, was a woman who, as a result of a car crash, was left in a
persistent vegetative state.20 Surgeons placed a feeding tube in her
arm for long-term support, and her parents objected to the feeding
tube once it became apparent that Nancy would not regain her
mental faculties.21 When her parents asked the hospital to remove
the feeding tube, the hospital stated that it could not do so without a
court order, which the parents subsequently sought.22 The trial court
initially approved the court order based on evidence that Nancy had
told a friend earlier that year that she:
expressed thoughts at age twenty-five in somewhat
serious conversation with a housemate friend that if
sick or injured she would not wish to continue her
life unless she could live at least halfway normally
suggests that given her present condition she would
not wish to continue on with her nutrition and
hydration.23

16

See Charlotte McDonald-Gibson, Belgium Extends Euthanasia Law to Kids,
TIME (Feb. 13, 2014), http://time.com/7565/belgium-euthanasia-law-childrenassisted-suicide.
17
See supra note 15.
18
Id.
19
Cruzan v. Missouri, 497 U.S. 261, 277 (1990).
20
Id. at 266.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 267.
23
Id. at 268.
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The State of Missouri, as well as Nancy’s guardian ad litem,
immediately appealed the decision.24 The Missouri Supreme Court
reversed, ruling that in the absence of a legitimate living will or clear
and convincing evidence, a person may not refuse treatment for
another, even a family member.25
Nancy’s parents then petitioned the Supreme Court of the
United States for a writ of certiorari, and the Court agreed to hear
the case.26 The Supreme Court of the United States held that the
State of Missouri’s “clear and convincing” evidence standard did
not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.27
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized a
competent individual’s right to refuse life-saving medical
treatment.28 However, the Court ruled that it was not a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment for a third party seeking to refuse lifesaving medical treatment for an incompetent individual to bear a
higher burden of proof.29 The Court stated, “An incompetent person
is not able to make an informed and voluntary choice to exercise a
hypothetical right to refuse treatment or any other right.”30
In her concurrence, Justice O’Connor wrote separately to
address the issues that the Court did not decide; namely, that the
Court was simply addressing a standard of proof as not in violation
of the Constitution; and the Court was not deciding whether the
Constitution required the several states to follow the directions of
the patient’s duly appointed surrogate.31 She also noted that the
Court also did not address the propriety of states developing other
methods of safeguarding an incompetent individual’s liberty interest
in refusing medical treatment.32 Justice O’Connor’s concurrence
focused on the majority’s narrow holding.33 The line that perhaps
best expresses the implication of the Court’s silence was this:
“Today we decide only that one State’s practice does not violate the
Constitution; the more challenging task of crafting appropriate
procedures for safeguarding incompetents’ liberty interests is
entrusted to the ‘laboratory’ of the States.”34 O’Connor observed
that the issue was a delicate one.35 As this was the first case that the
Supreme Court heard regarding the “right to die,” it is significant
24

Id.
Id.
26
Id., cert. granted, 492 U.S. 917 (1989).
27
Id. at 286.
28
Id. at 278.
29
Id. at 280.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 289
32
Id. at 290-92
33
Id.
34
Id. at 292.
35
Id.
25
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that the highest court in the federal judicial system was quick to
defer to state interpretations of the “right to die,” and indicates, from
the beginning of the Court’s jurisprudence, a willingness to leave
such decisions up to the individual state.
Following Cruzan, the next major development in Supreme
Court jurisprudence on the “right to die” specifically addressed the
narrower, related issue of physician-assisted suicide in a pair of
companion cases decided on the same day – Washington v.
Glucksberg36 and Vacco v. Quill.37 In Glucksberg, the plaintiffs
were physicians, terminally ill patients, and a non-profit
organization called “Compassion in Dying.”38 They challenged
Washington’s ban against assisted suicide, claiming that it was a
liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.39 On writ
of certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause
did not protect the right to assistance in committing suicide.40 The
Court reasoned that the State of Washington had an “unqualified
interest in the preservation of human life” that was not to be weighed
differently according to “the medical condition and the wishes of the
person whose life is at stake.”41 The Court rejected such a “slidingscale approach” and gave substantial deference to the “number of
state interests” implicated by Washington’s assisted suicide ban in
reaching its holding.42
In Vacco, the plaintiffs were physicians, and they challenged
a newly enacted prohibition in the state of New York against
physician-assisted suicide, which criminalized the action.43 The
plaintiffs claimed the prohibition was a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, because it treated patients with a terminal illness who
are on life support differently than those who were not on life
support.44 Upon writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court held that states
have a legitimate interest in outlawing assisted suicide, and that
“liberty” does not include a right to physician-assisted suicide.”45
The Court again delineated a number of legitimate state interests that
New York used to justify the ban, and further reasoned that Equal
Protection was not violated because all individuals were subject to
36

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 707-08 (1997).
Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 797-98 (1997).
38
Washington, 521 U.S. at 707-08.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 735.
41
Id. at 729.
42
Id.
43
Vacco, 521 U.S. 793 at 797-98.
44
Id. at 798.
45
Id. at 807-09.
37
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the statute and thus the prohibition did not treat individuals
differently.46 The Court said:
On their faces, neither New York’s ban on assisting suicide
nor its statutes permitting patients to refuse medical treatment treat
anyone differently from anyone else or draw any distinctions
between persons. Everyone, regardless of physical condition, is
entitled, if competent, to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical
treatment; no one is permitted to assist a suicide. Generally
speaking, laws that apply evenhandedly to all “unquestionably
comply” with the Equal Protection Clause.47
In addition to court cases, some states have addressed the
issue of “right to die” through state statute. The first state to legalize
physician-assisted suicide, Oregon, did so through a ballot measure,
but a lengthy injunction delayed implementation of the law until
1997.48 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals lifted the injunction and
determined that several patients, doctors, and residential care
facilities (all from the State of Oregon) lacked the “injury-in-fact”
required for standing to bring a challenge to the law, and thus the
federal court had no jurisdiction to decide any related constitutional
issues.49 The Supreme Court denied certiorari on the standing
issue,50 potentially because it had already expressed its opinions
about the “right to die” and state autonomy in developing it. The
United States Supreme Court was silent on the issue for several
years.
The next Supreme Court case on this issue was brought in
2006. In Gonzales v. Oregon, after Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act
was passed, United States Attorney General John Ashcroft issued an
Interpretive Rule that physician-assisted suicide was not a legitimate
medical purpose and that any physician administering drugs to that
effect violated the Controlled Substances Act.51 Oregon, along with
a physician, pharmacist, and several terminally ill patients from
Oregon, challenged the rule.52 The district court issued an injunction
against the enforcement of the rule, which the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed.53 Upon granting the Attorney General’s writ of
certiorari, the United States Supreme Court affirmed.54 The Court
held that the Interpretive Rule was not entitled to deference under
several prior deferential standards established by the Court, since in
46

Id. at 799-800.
Id. at 800.
48
Lee v. Oregon, 891 F.Supp. 1439, 1439 (D. Oregon 1995).
49
See Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1997).
50
Lee v. Harcleroad, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 927 (1997).
51
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 254 (2006).
52
Id. at 255.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 275.
47
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order to be given deference, “the rule must be promulgated pursuant
to authority Congress has delegated to the official.”55 The Court
viewed his Interpretive Rule as an improper use of power, stating:
The Attorney General has rulemaking power to
fulfill his duties under the CSA. The specific respects
in which he is authorized to make rules, however,
instruct us that he is not authorized to make a rule
declaring illegitimate a medical standard for care and
treatment of patients that is specifically authorized
under state law.56 . . . The Government, in the end,
maintains that the prescription requirement delegates
to a single executive officer the power to effect a
radical shift of authority from the States to the
Federal Government to define general standards of
medical practice in every locality. The text and
structure of the CSA show that Congress did not have
this far-reaching intent to alter the federal-state
balance and the congressional role in maintaining
it.57
Following that decision, the Supreme Court has been silent
on the issue, and it seems well-settled that the Courts have, at least
incidentally, adopted Justice O’Connor’s approach in Cruzan,
deferring to the states as to what falls within the constitutional
bounds of the “right to die.” What follows is a history of the various
states that have legalized physician-assisted suicide within the
United States.
II.

PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE IN THE
UNITED STATES

Discussions of the legalization of physician-assisted suicide
through statute began to take place as early as 1906, when a woman
named Anna Hill, whose mother had died a particularly painful
death from cancer, inspired legislation in Ohio that contemplated
legalizing “voluntary euthanasia” for competent adults who were
fatally wounded, terminally ill, or suffering from extreme pain.58
Ultimately, the bill was defeated.59 In the following years, various
55

Id. at 258
Id. at 258.
57
Id. at 275.
58
Thane Josef Messinger, A Gentle and Easy Death: From Ancient Greece to
Beyond Cruzan Toward A Reasoned Legal Response to the Societal Dilemma of
Euthanasia, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 175, 189 (1993).
59
Id. at 190.
56
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individuals (both physicians and laypersons) were prosecuted for
assisting suicides.60 The public’s attitude toward the issue vacillated
based on the current political climate; for instance, euthanasia was
utilized quite frequently in Nazi Germany, leading many Americans
to abhor physician-assisted suicide as tantamount to the same
horrible practice.61 As the right to refuse life-saving medical
treatment began to develop, public opinion began to shift as well,
with constituents beginning to more actively discuss the issue.62 In
fact, a Gallup poll conducted in 1973 reported an increase in
favorable views toward physician-assisted suicide.63
Of course, no discussion of physician-assisted suicide would
be complete without the man who invokes a knee-jerk thought when
the practice is discussed – Dr. Jack Kevorkian.64 The publication of
Dr. Kevorkian’s activism and criminal prosecution sparked a fair
amount of public discourse.65 Dr. Kevorkian’s arguably most
famous statement, taken (almost ironically) from a book on
Christian ethics, perhaps best embodies the attitude of the states that
have legalized physician-assisted suicide since 1994 – “Dying is not
a crime.”66
A.

Progression of Valid Physician-Assisted Suicide Laws

In 1994, Oregon became the first state to allow its residents
suffering from terminally ill diseases or conditions to obtain lethal
doses of medication from their treating physicians for the purposes
of self-administering the doses and thereby ending their own lives.67
Oregon accomplished this through the establishment of the aptlynamed “Oregon Right to Die” political committee, consisting of
various businessmen, lawyers, and medical professionals.68 The
committee drafted several variations of the bill before settling on
60

Id.
Id. at 199.
62
Id. at 206.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 212-13. Dr. Jack Kevorkian was an American pathologist who rose to
infamy by assisting terminally ill patients with ending their lives. He had a
significant impact on the modern debate about physician-assisted suicide.
65
Id. at 213.
66
Samuel Wells & Ben Quash INTRODUCING CHRISTIAN ETHICS. 329 (John
Wiley and Sons 2010).
67
See Center for Disease Prevention & Epidemiology – Oregon Health Division,
Physician-Assisted Suicide. 1997.
http://public.health.oregon.gov/DiseasesConditions/CommunicableDisease/CDS
ummaryNewsletter/Documents/1997/ohd4623.pdf (published on November 11,
1997).
68
See Death with Dignity, Oregon Death with Dignity Act: A History.
https://www.deathwithdignity.org/oregon-death-with-dignity-act-history/ (last
visited February 17, 2017).
61
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“Measure 16,” which is what is now referred to as the “Death with
Dignity Act.”69 Oregon voters approved of the Death with Dignity
Act by a margin of 51.31% to 48.69%.70 The Act made physicianassisted suicide legal within the state of Oregon under certain
circumstances, and it provided a number of safeguards to prevent
abuse, mistake, and coercion.71
The Oregon Death with Dignity Act (the “Act”) allows a
patient to request a prescription for a lethal dose of medication that
would terminate the patient’s life.72 A patient requesting this must
have been diagnosed with a terminal illness that would otherwise
kill the patient within six months, and the request must be made
twice orally and once in writing.73 The two oral requests must be
separated by a period of at least 15 days, and the written request
must be signed in the presence of two witnesses.74 The requests must
all be voluntary and initiated by a competent patient who has
reached the age of majority.75 The physician who will prescribe the
medication must consult with another physician to determine the
diagnosis of the illness as terminal.76 Moreover, a medical
professional potentially involved in this process is allowed to refuse
to participate on moral grounds.77 The request must be attested to by
two disinterested witnesses, one of whom must not be a family
member.78 There are various procedural safeguards in place to
ensure that the terminally ill patient is making this decision
voluntarily and competently.79 Further, the patient may retract the
request at any time during the process.80
As mentioned above, the enactment of the Act was
accomplished through a ballot measure. A subsequent ballot
measure to overturn the prior one was unsuccessful.81 In fact, the
margin by which the measure to repeal the Act passed was greater
than the initial measure.82 Initially, a federal district court judge
placed a temporary injunction on the implementation of the Act; the
69

OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 (2016).
Oregon Secretary of State, Initiative, Referendum and Recall: 1988-1995,
Oregon Blue Book. http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/elections/elections21.htm
(last visited February 20, 2017) [hereinafter “Initiative, Referendum and
Recall”].
71
See generally OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 et seq. (West 2017).
72
OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 § 2.01 (West 2017).
73
OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 § 3.06 (West 2017).
74
OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 § 3.08-.09 (West 2017).
75
OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 § 2.01 (West 2017).
76
OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 § 3.02 (West 2017).
77
OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 § 4.01 (West 2017).
78
OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 § 3.09 (West 2017).
79
OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 § 3.01-.14 (West 2017).
80
OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 § 3.07 (West 2017).
81
See Initiative, Referendum and Recall, supra note 69.
82
Id.
70
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injunction became permanent in August 1995, and both parties
appealed on various legal issues.83 In 1997, the United State Court
of Appeals for the 9th Circuit dismissed the claim on jurisdictional
grounds, effectively terminating the injunction and deferring to
Oregon’s right to develop its own laws.84 Although there have been
various attempts to repeal the Act or withhold the lethally prescribed
drugs, Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act remains the law.
Over a decade passed before physician-assisted suicide was
legalized in another state. In 2008, Washington submitted for a vote
“Initiative 1000,” which is what is now referred to as Washington’s
own “Death with Dignity Act.”85 Unlike the initial ballot measure in
Oregon, Initiative 1000 was approved by a greater margin – 57.82%
to 42.18%.86 A similar measure submitted to the public in 1991 had
been rejected by the voters87, but unlike that measure, which would
allow the physicians to administer the lethal doses of medication,
Initiative 1000 required the patient to self-administer the
medication.88
The law contains similar procedural safeguards to the
Oregon Act and some opt-outs.89 For instance, individual hospitals
can choose to refuse to participate in physician-assisted suicide as
long as it explicitly states its position to do so in the policies and
procedures that the hospital makes available to its staff.90 Like the
Oregon statute, the Washington Death with Dignity Act contains
requirements of competency, a series of requests, and some waiting
periods between requests and prescription of the medication.91 Upon
a close reading of Washington’s Act, it appears that it closely
mirrors the Oregon Act due to similarly tracked language.
The next state to legalize physician-assisted suicide,
Montana, did so in a different way – through a court ruling. Robert
Baxter was an elderly, retired truck driver residing in Montana who
had been diagnosed with terminal lymphocytic leukemia.92 As he
83

See Lee v. Oregon, 869 F.Supp. 1491 (D. Or. 1994; affirmed by 891 F.Supp.
1439 (D. Or. 1995).
84
See Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1997).
85
See generally R.W.C.A. § 70.245 et seq. (West 2017).
86
See Washington Secretary of State, Initiative Measure 1000 concerns
allowing certain terminally ill competent adults to obtain lethal prescriptions,
http://results.vote.wa.gov/results/20081104/Initiative-Measure-1000-concernsallowing-certain-terminally-ill-competent-adults-to-obtain-lethalprescriptions.html (last visited February 15, 2017).
87
See Death With Dignity, Washington Death with Dignity Act: A History,
https://www.deathwithdignity.org/washington-death-with-dignity-act-history/
(last visited February 15, 2017).
88
R.W.C.A. § 70.245.010 (West 2017).
89
R.W.C.A. § 70.245.190 (West 2017).
90
Id.
91
R.W.C.A. § 70.245.020 to .130 (West 2017).
92
Baxter v. Montana, 354 Mont. 234, 237 (2009).
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began to receive chemotherapy treatments, they became less and
less effective.93 Without a cure and with no prospect for recovery,
Mr. Baxter wanted to ingest a lethal dose of medication that he could
self-administer at the time of his choosing in order to end his pain
and suffering.94 He filed an action along with four physicians and an
organization called “Compassion & Choices” seeking to establish a
constitutional right to receive and provide aid in dying.95 The state
argued that Montana’s constitution conferred no such right.96 The
district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, and Mr. Baxter died that
same day.97 The district court held that “constitutional rights of
individual privacy and human dignity, taken together, encompass
the right of a competent, terminally-ill patient to die with dignity.”98
The Montana Supreme Court vacated the district court’s
resolution of the constitutional issues and declined to state its
holding on that basis. Rather, it based its holding on an alternate
statutory basis.99 Namely, the court said that physicians may use the
state’s consent statute as a defense, stating, “[t]he consent of the
victim to conduct charged to constitute an offense or to the result
thereof is a defense.”100 The court dismissed the Appellants’
argument that the exception to this type of consent as “against public
policy” was inapplicable because “courts that have considered this
issue yields unanimous understanding that consent is rendered
ineffective as ‘against public policy’ in assault cases characterized
by aggressive and combative acts that breach public peace and
physically endanger others.”101 The court stated that there was
“nothing in Montana Supreme Court precedent or Montana statutes
indicating that physician aid in dying is against public policy.”102
Although there have been attempts to circumvent the ’court’s
determination through the legislature, these have been unsuccessful,
and physician-assisted suicide remains legal at common law.
A few years after the Montana decision, Vermont became
the fourth state to legalize the practice.103 Prior to the passage of the
law, a poll conducted indicated that 74% of voters in that state
favored “mentally competent, terminally ill patients with less than
six months to live to be able to end their life in a humane and
dignified manner, using prescription medications they can self93
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administer.”104 Unlike Oregon and Washington, however, Vermont
did not put it to a vote of the people. In May 2013, the Vermont
General Assembly voted to approve “Act 39,” which is more
commonly referred to as the “Patient Choice and Control at the End
of Life Act.”105 This was a departure from the practice of citizens
drafting the bill and proposing it as a ballot measure. Instead, it was
designed by lawmakers and put to a vote in the state legislature.106
This Act is also extremely similar to the statutes passed in
Oregon and Washington. The various waiting periods and methods
of requesting the prescription, as well as the physician’s role in the
process, bear a striking resemblance to the related statutes in those
two other states.107 Like the other two states that had legalized
physician-assisted suicide prior to Vermont’s Act, the Vermont
required residency and stated that insurance companies may not
deny benefits that would be otherwise conferred simply because a
patient acts in accord with the Act.108 However, a patient loses his
or her protections if he or she takes the prescribed medication
outside of Vermont’s jurisdiction.109 This might implicate the
patient’s insurance rights, as the death may be ruled a suicide in a
state where ingesting the medication is illegal.
On June 9, 2016, the California legislature passed the “End
of Life Option Act,” making it the fifth state to legalize physicianassisted suicide.110 In November 2016, Colorado joined the fold as
the sixth state and its citizens approved “”the “End of Life Options
Act,” with 64.87% of those who voted in favor of the ballot
measure.111 Polling in both of these jurisdictions indicated that a
majority of the voters polled supported physician-assisted suicide in
the circumstances anticipated by the statutory language.112 These
Acts also contained the same requirements and safeguards as those
of other states, and they were mainly guided by those states in both
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the drafting of the legislative/ballot measures and the
implementation thereafter.113
Finally, the most recent jurisdiction to legalize physicianassisted suicide was the District of Columbia. The bill, named the
Death with Dignity Act, was introduced in the Council of the
District of Columbia (the unicameral legislative body of that
district),114 signed by the Mayor, and sent to the United States
Congress for review. Ultimately, attempts to oppose the bill’s
passage were unsuccessful, and the law became effective on
February 20, 2017.115 It is worth noting that, as of the date of this
Note, seven jurisdictions have legalized the practice of physicianassisted suicide, and six of these have done so within the past
decade. So, it appears that the momentum of legalizing physicianassisted suicide is on the rise, at least for now.
In all other jurisdictions, physician-assisted suicide remains
prohibited under state law. Before examining the various
justifications and defenses both in favor of and against the practice,
it is necessary to briefly examine the current legal status of
physician-assisted suicide in all jurisdictions but these seven.
B.

Prohibitions Against Physician-Assisted Suicide

In January 2014, New Mexico looked as if it would join
Montana as the second state to have physician-assisted suicide
legalized at common law.116 The plaintiffs were physicians and a
patient who was currently in remission from uterine cancer, but
feared its return and wanted the “‘peace of mind’ of knowing that
aid in dying would be an option available to her if she [found] her
suffering in the terminal stage of her cancer unbearable.”117 The
State objected and emphasized that the state had a compelling
interest in criminalizing physician aid in dying.118 A district court
judge ruled that physicians who rendered aid in dying to their
patients could not be prosecuted under the state’s Assisted Suicide
Statute.119 The court stated:
“This court cannot envision a right more fundamental, more
private or more integral to the liberty, safety and happiness
of a New Mexican than the right of a competent, terminally
113

See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.1 et. seq. (West 2017); COLO. REV.
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ill patient to choose aid in dying. . . . If decisions made in the
shadow of one’s imminent death regarding how they and
their loved ones will face that death are not fundamental and
at the core of these constitutional guarantees, then what
decisions are?”120
Several days later, the court entered a declaratory judgment
and an injunction to that effect.121 The State of New Mexico
appealed, and the Court of Appeals of New Mexico held that
physician-assisted suicide was neither a fundamental liberty interest
protected by due process nor inherent in an individual’s right to life,
liberty, and happiness.122 Upon writ of certiorari to the Supreme
Court of New Mexico, that court affirmed the decision of the
appellate court below, and thus physician-assisted suicide was
prohibited by court ruling on June 30, 2016.123
On January 30, 2017, a “death with dignity” bill, styled the
“End of Life Options Act,” was introduced in the New Mexico
House of Representatives.124 A companion bill was also introduced
in the New Mexico Senate.125 As of the date of this Note, no
significant developments have taken place with respect to the
progression of this legislation.126
In all other states, physician-assisted suicide remains illegal.
If a physician gives renders any assistance to a patient in terminating
the patient’s own life, the physician can be (and most assuredly will
be) both criminally and civilly liable. In the states where all
physician-assisted suicide is against the law, the debate rages on,
with those on both sides of the issue approaching it from various
angles.
i. Arguments Against Legalization
The arguments against the legalization of physician-assisted
suicide are not merely moral or religious objections. The potential
for fraud and abuse, as well as the possible difference in statutory
interpretations that might be given where the statute is ambiguous,
are worthy of attention and belong in any discussion about whether
the practice should be legalized in that particular jurisdiction.
120
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Of course, there is the moral opposition to the procedure, and
in a nation that is vastly religious (whether it be Christian or
otherwise), the gravity of that certainly should not be downplayed
as (at the very least) a passive influence on opponents of physicianassisted suicide and the debate in general. Various denominations
and sects are split on their views regarding the practice of physicianassisted suicide.127 Most adherents to Christianity oppose the
practice, claiming that God is the ultimate judge and that the
determination of when and in what manner to die is left to Him, not
human preferences.128 Buddhists believe that assisted suicide runs
contrary to the basic tenet of Buddhism that one should not kill
another living being, but followers of the religion recognize feel
differently about refusal of medical treatment, especially when
pointless.129 Several other religions also decry the practice under a
“slippery-slope” argument, whereby physician-assisted suicide
could extend from the very terminally ill to other vulnerable
populations based on preconceived notions of self-worth and social
status.130
Unrelated to moral and religious objections are the practical
difficulties that may arise; for instance, determining the competency
of individuals. What distinguishes a competent individual from an
incompetent one can sometimes be easy. For example, an
ambulatory person with terminal cancer may still be able to speak
and reason, and so would likely be competent, whereas the injured
in Cruzan was in a permanent vegetative state and obviously
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See infra note 129, 130, 131.
John B. Mitchell, My Father, John Locke, and Assisted Suicide: The Real
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theological argument [is] a form of Thomas Aquinas’ classic argument against
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Margaret Somerville, Is Legalizing Euthanasia an Evolution or Revolution in
Societal Values?, 34 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 747, 773 (2016) (“A chilling example
of the logical slippery slope is the euthanizing, in December 2012, of 45 year old
twins in Belgium. Deaf since childhood, Marc and Eddy Verbessem were facing
the additional disability of blindness. Accepting that they were irremediably
suffering, their physician euthanized them.”).
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incompetent.131 However, difficulties arise when the lines are
blurred. For instance, many individuals may experience periods
called “lucid intervals” where they are fully competent for purposes
of legal efficacy.132 During a lucid interval, a person may fully
understand the implications of his or her decision, as well as the
gravity of his or her situation, and wish to seek aid in dying from the
physician in a completely competent state.133 There are obvious
difficulties with this factual scenario that indicate that the presence
of a cognitive disorder alone cannot be determinative of the
competency level necessary to request physician-assisted suicide.134
The various areas of the law where a competency
determination is a prerequisite for carrying out some sort of legally
significant act does not bring clarification to this issue. There are
varying degrees of competency required to enter into a contract, to
marry, to divorce, to write a living will, etc.135 Which one is the best,
and why is it the best?136 There are arguments to be made at all
competency levels, and the fact that such arguments are out there
introduces wrinkles into determining competency for such an
irreversible decision.137 Opponents of physician-assisted suicide
131
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a mental disorder?”).
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maintain that these wrinkles bolster their reasoning for statutes
against physician-assisted suicide, since “competency” is seemingly
vague.
Many medical professionals consider the practice of
physician-assisted suicide to violate the Hippocratic Oath.138 The
Oath states, “I will give no deadly medicine to anyone if asked, nor
suggest any such counsel.”139 Opponents of physician-assisted
suicide argue that the practice runs contrary to the Hippocratic Oath,
which is prominently displayed to the public as well as revered by
most who practice medicine.140
ii.

Arguments in Favor of Legalization

Proponents of physician-assisted suicide contend that a
person should be able to die with dignity.141 The terminally ill cancer
patient that continues to suffer day in and day out should be able to
die on his or her own terms, not continue to suffer in front of family,
friends, and caretakers, and thus be subjected to indignities. In fact,
the legislation passed in Oregon, Washington, and the District of
Columbia all contain the word “dignity” in the Act, and that is part
of the justification given for their passage. Supporters of physicianassisted suicide laws argue that states should not force people to
depend on others for even the most menial of tasks or to powerlessly
sit by and watch the hours tick by as they count down to their
impending demise.142
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suicide, a legislature may be justified in limiting the means by which it is
achieved.”).
142
Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169,
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Moreover, autonomy in choosing when one will die, when it
is determined that one will inevitably die within a specified time
period, is important to advocates of physician-assisted suicide
because it allows competent individuals to request the expedition of
their death.143 Terminally ill patients are already severely lacking in
their own personal liberties, so extending this right to them as a form
of liberty can be benign and sympathetic while also remaining
within the constitutional confines of personal liberty.144 Proponents
of physician-assisted suicide liken prohibitions against terminally ill
patients requesting aid in dying to be a severe deprivation of
personal liberty: “The exercise of the right to privacy (in the
personal autonomy sense), can become a means to protecting
dignity, and protecting dignity in this context can assure that one of
our most important private choices is secure. The two rights provide
complementary protections.”145
There are several procedural safeguards in the states that
have extended the right to physician-assisted suicide, and several of
them are identified above. These include: a minimum age,
voluntariness with the opportunity to rescind, the requirement that
the patient competently make the request more than once,
encouragement to seek counseling, and several others.146 While
opponents of this idea have suggested that people will flock to these
states—that reality is not borne out by the data—primarily because
these state statutes also contain a residency requirement.147
Moreover, the number of people that may seek physician-assisted
suicide and obtain it is severely limited by the fact that at least one
physician must diagnose the patient with a terminal illness that will
kill the patient within six months.148 These standards and
requirements are so exacting and strong that they are subject to no
more abuse than any other statute guaranteeing a personal liberty,
and arguably, they are subject to less abuse.
143
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Comparison with Other Legal Standards

In some states and countries, a criminal charged with an
offense punishable by death may, once sentenced to death, forego
all of his appeal rights and “volunteer” to let the death sentence be
carried out.149 Some scholarly articles have suggested that this act is
comparable to physician-assisted suicide.150 The death row inmate
knows that, in all likelihood, he will presumably face death; he is
statutorily allowed to face it as soon as plausible if he foregoes his
appeal rights. That reasoning fits squarely with the terminally ill
patient who knows she is about to die as well.151 In order for a
prisoner to abandon all appeals in this manner, the Supreme Court
has required that he make a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent
waiver of his rights to appeal and be mentally competent.152 Mental
competence is not a high bar.153 The Supreme Court recognized that
this standard permits even severely mentally ill defendants to be
found competent to waive certain trial rights, even if they are
otherwise mentally incompetent in other respects.154 Thus, prisoners
have less procedural protections than terminally ill patients seeking
to die in states where physician-assisted suicide is legal, and yet
courts have said that even these minimum protections for prisoners
do not violate the Constitution.
149
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Another area in which the law has developed more
thoroughly in an analogous way is the issue of abortion rights.155 As
with physician-assisted suicide, abortion rights allow a woman to
maintain autonomy in choosing the manner, method, and time in
which to deliver her child (if she choose to do so at all). The
Supreme Court uses the “fetal viability” standard to determine
whether a woman’s rights to seek an abortion are being infringed
upon.156 The rationale behind allowing abortion in limited
circumstances (which many of the most staunch pro-life advocates
offer as justifiable causes for doing so) – such as rape, incest, and
the endangerment of the mother’s life – can be properly extended to
physician-assisted suicide as well because of the exigent
circumstances that must exist (in the states that allow physicianassisted suicide) for a patient to request such action. Certainly,
inherent in these exceptions that pro-life and pro-choice advocates
have carved out is the “freedom to choose.” The woman who was
raped wants to be able to choose to have a child rather than have it
foisted upon her; the woman who is having a child as a product of
incest desires the freedom to have a baby that is healthy and without
the many genetic abnormalities that are more likely to arise as a
result of mating within one’s own gene pool; and the mother whose
life is in danger due to complications during delivery may wish to
preserve her own life over the life coming into being. The reasoning
is similar in that a patient knows that he is going to die, and he
simply wants the freedom to choose a more expeditious death
process.157
III.

STATE PATHWAYS TO LEGALIZATION

Thinking back to Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in
Cruzan, she believed that states should be free to retain and develop
a basic constitutional “right to die” that is inherent in due process
considerations.158 She believed the interpretation of this right,
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including how far to extend the right, is best left to the states.159 This
is markedly different than the Court’s other forays into foisting the
widespread adoption of certain liberties on all states through
preempting state action through a court ruling.160 In an age where
the Tenth Amendment is mostly a truism due to federal regulation
and oversight, leaving issues like this up to states is a means of
giving the states back the powers that they should have rightly been
exercising in the first place. There is an inevitable tension that arises
when thinking about whether to expand a federal right, for
expanding a federal right always places burdens upon states, as they
must observe it regardless of their own statutes or state constitutions.
As this issue has been left (at least for now) within the discretion of
the states, the states that are considering whether to legalize the
practice of physician-assisted suicide must decide the best approach
to handling the issue, especially if a state’s ultimate decision is to
authorize the practice.
A.

Legislative Action vs. Judicial Activism

There are two methods whereby physician-assisted suicide
can be legalized – through legislative action (whether it be
representative democracy or pure direct democracy) or through
judicial review. Currently, only one state has indirectly authorized
physician-assisted suicide in certain situations through the
judiciary.161 There is a separation of powers consideration inherent
in discerning whether a constitutional issue like physician-assisted
suicide should be decided by the legislature or the judiciary162. For
a number of reasons, the judiciary is not the proper place to resolve
this important question. Judicial action exists to determine the
constitutionality and validity of laws,163 but with a controversial
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topic involving states’ rights that are not necessarily well-settled, the
more proper place is the legislature.164
Five states have now implemented ballot measures that have
received a majority of votes in favor of physician-assisted suicide.165
This is a states’ rights issue, and the Supreme Court implicitly held
as much in Gonzales v. Oregon when it deferred to Oregon’s Death
with Dignity Act.166 The Act, contained in a ballot measure, came
under fire with a subsequent attempt to repeal by another ballot
measure three years later.167 As the latter measure was rejected by a
much greater margin than the first measure passed,168 this is proof
that the legislature embodies the will of the people, and as the
country and states are founded on concepts of democracy, it would
be best to let the people decide how to run their states.
By now, states like Oregon and Washington have empirical
data on the usage and effects of the legislative measures they have
passed legalizing physician-assisted suicide in certain
circumstances. Contrary to the argument that residents would flock
to utilize these procedures en masse, since 1997, only 1,749 people
have been prescriptions written under Oregon’s statute; only 1,127
of those have died as a result of consuming the prescribed dose
(64.4%).169 With respect to more recent data obtained in Oregon, in
2016, only 204 people received lethal doses of medication in
compliance with the statute.170 During that year, 133 people died as
a result of ingesting this medication; of those, 19 that died has been
prescribed the medication during previous years.171 During 2016,
the patients who received the prescriptions were mainly those 65
years of age or older (80.5%) and (likely with some overlap) those
suffering from a terminal form of cancer (78.9%).172 The data
showed that the three most frequently mentioned end-of-life
concerns for patients who obtained prescriptions in 2016 were loss
of autonomy (89.5%), decreasing ability to participate in activities
164
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that made life enjoyable (89.5%), and loss of dignity (65.4%).173
This is consistent with data from previous years.174 Most notably, in
2016, zero physicians were referred to the Oregon Medical Board
for failure to comply with statutory requirements.175
Although Washington’s Death with Dignity Act was passed
more recently, annual reports can still be found containing
somewhat similar data. From 2009 (the first year the medication was
available) until 2015 (the most recent obtainable data), 938 people
received prescriptions for the medication.176 Of those, 917 ingested
the medication and died (97.8%).177 This is somewhat higher than
Oregon, but there appears to be no reason why some take the
medication and some do not.178 During 2015, the patients who
received the prescriptions were mainly those 65 years of age or older
(73.9%) and (likely with some overlap) those suffering from a
terminal form of cancer (72%).179 The data showed that the three
most frequently mentioned end-of-life concerns for patients who
obtained prescriptions in 2016 were loss of autonomy (85.8%),
decreasing ability to participate in activities that made life enjoyable
(86.3%), and loss of dignity (68.5%); this is consistent with data
from previous years.180 No data was available to determine whether
any physicians had been referred to the Washington Medical Board
for failure to comply with statutory requirements.181
The laws passed in Vermont, California, Colorado, and the
District of Columbia are simply too recent and simply do not have
enough data to conduct a proper analysis of the law’s’ effects. It will
be interesting to see if these states produce reports bearing
similarities to Oregon and Washington as the conversation continues
in states where the practice is still against the law. Similar data
would indicate the propriety of leaving the legalization of physicianassisted suicide in the hands of the legislature.
By contrast, medical professionals in the State of Montana
have been left in a situation tantamount to “legal purgatory,”
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because there is no guidance.182 As the Baxter case did not decide
the constitutional question, but rather focused on determination
guided by public policy in the absence of statutory language or case
law on the issue, there are no clear standards by which a physician
can be sure that his conduct in rendering physician-assisted suicide
to a patient does not violate a criminal or civil statute. Unlike the
procedural safeguards in Oregon, Washington, etc. that guide the
physician in complying fully with constitutional and statutory law,
there is no guidance under this nebulous court ruling. Even though
the Journal of Palliative Medicine has undertaken to give physicians
in Montana some guidance, there is still no legal regulatory
framework for medical professionals practicing in that state to
follow.183
Seven years have now passed since Montana’s highest court
decided the case, and it is becoming clear now that the lack of data
and analysis of the effects of the case stem from the physicians
making individual choices, under the circumstances, with no
regulatory scheme to direct them. There are no reports, and thus no
data to express demographics, prevalence of the practice, or a
patient’s underlying motivations for seeking the procedure.
Because of the disparity in analyzing the effects of the
legalization of physician-assisted suicide in jurisdictions where it is
a statutory right versus the jurisdiction where it is legal at common
law, legislation is a preferable approach, as it creates a framework
for discussions among medical professionals as well as society-atlarge.
B.

Representative Democracy vs. Direct Democracy

Several mechanisms exist by which a bill can become a law,
but the fundamental democratic dichotomy is whether to create a
statutory right through representative democracy or pure
democracy. The six jurisdictions with statutes providing for
physician-assisted suicide are split in the manner in which they got
there. Oregon, Washington, and Colorado instituted their laws
through ballot measures drafted by experienced professionals and
submitted to the people for a vote.184 Vermont, California, and the
District of Columbia drafted bills and introduced them directly to
182
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their respective legislative houses.185 While there are certainly valid
concerns regarding representative democracy, pure democracy was
not envisioned by the Framers of the Constitution.186 Senator John
C. Calhoun once put this consternation quite succinctly, when he
said, “The Government of the absolute majority instead of the
Government of the people is but the Government of the strongest
interests; and when not efficiently checked, it is the most tyrannical
and oppressive that can be devised.”187 Although certainly special
interest groups and political contributions are concerns of
representative democracy, James Madison considered a republican
form of government the most desirable form of government for
checking the power of democracy.188 Further, the right to every state
to have a “republican form of government” is manifested explicitly
in the United States Constitution.189 If the Framers of the
Constitution considered representative democracy the best form of
state governance, then it seems that representative legislative action
is more suitable to decide a constitutional issues left to the discretion
of the states than pure direct democracy.
C. Potential Positive Future Effects of Widespread Adoption
Up until this point, this Note has not opined about the effects
of widespread adoption among the states of physician-assisted
suicide in certain circumstances and subject to the various
procedural safeguards provided above. However speculative an
analysis of these possible effects may be, there is at least some
indication that providers and patients alike have benefitted in the
jurisdictions where the possibility of physician-assisted suicide is
available.
Although it may seem initially insensitive, there can be no
doubt that health care costs remain high within the United States,
and long-term care costs pose a problem in particular.190 This is not
to suggest that an individual should take into consideration the
185
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effects of his cost burden on American society when determining
whether to request a lethal dose of medication for his terminal
illness. It is simply a note that allowing individuals in certain
circumstances, many of whom do require quite expensive long-term
care, will have an incidental effect of decreasing long-term health
care costs in the long run, as the medication itself is relatively
inexpensive by comparison.191 A widespread adoption could
plausibly lead to lower long-term health care costs as people exit the
market.
Widespread adoption could also decrease forum shopping.
Although states statutes do thus far contain a residency requirement,
the actual determination of whether a person is a resident for
purposes of the statute is left to the physician’s discretion. For
example, in Oregon, such factors include: “an Oregon Driver
License, a lease agreement or property ownership document
showing that the patient rents or owns property in Oregon, an
Oregon voter registration, or a recent Oregon tax return.”192
Additionally, there is no minimum residency requirement.193
Although the data does not show thousands of terminally ill people
flocking to Oregon or Washington to establish residency for the sole
purpose of obtaining lethal medication, it is certainly reasonable to
posit that at least a few have done so.194 A widespread adoption
would reduce forum shopping or “doctor shopping,” and those who
truly wish to end their lives in a dignified and autonomous manner
would be able to do so with physicians who have been treating them
from the onset of their respective illnesses.
Although this list is certainly not an exhaustive inventory of
the prospective benefits of widespread adoption, one final
consideration is allowing physicians more mobility. A physician
who primarily provides long-term care may receive several requests
from patients with terminal illnesses (who meet all the criteria
discussed earlier) to help them end their lives. However, in
jurisdictions where such a remedy is unavailable, the physician will
be unable to comply with the patient’s request. The physician may
not wish to move to any of the seven jurisdictions where the practice
is legal. A widespread adoption by the states of physician-assisted
suicide legislation would give physicians autonomy and, as noted in
the statutes above, physicians who have moral objections would be
able to remove themselves from the process without fear of
191
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retribution. There are still other considerations (and of course,
accompanying counter-arguments), but a widespread adoption
would leave state autonomy intact while providing both direct and
incidental benefits on federal and state levels.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Physician-assisted suicide is a controversial issue that
implicates significant constitutional issues, and the United States
Supreme Court has indicated that it is best left to each state to
determine whether and to what extent the “right to die” within that
state encompasses physician-assisted suicide. After seeing how it
has played out in the jurisdictions that have legalized the practice,
the best option seems to be to pass a legislative measure codifying
the methods and procedures whereby physician-assisted suicide
may be legally carried out. Not only does this offer guidance for
physicians contemplating whether they are able to be involved in
such a practice, but it provides empirical data and statistical analysis
in a way that a nebulous legal status at common law is simply unable
to do. The information gathered from a jurisdiction that guides its
physicians in this limited-circumstance implementation will serve to
guide other jurisdictions as they continue to have conversations,
about whether the “right to die” should allow a patient to die with
dignity. Perhaps this issue could even serve as a reminder of the
importance of state autonomy, and maybe then, the Tenth
Amendment could come back into greater focus as more than just a
truism.

